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Is the Gender Recognition Act 2004 as Important as it Seems? 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
University of Strathclyde 
 
Helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper were made by Dr Stephen Whittle, Head of 
the Graduate School of Law, Manchester Metropolitan University and these are gratefully 
acknowledged.  The argument presented here is mine, however, and not his.  Responsibility 
for remaining errors is (of course) mine alone. 
 
Introduction 
Gender matters.  However much the law strives for equal opportunities and 
outlaws sex discrimination, society remains gendered and so does the law.  
The assumed fact of gender will frequently determine how the law responds to 
particular persons or the circumstances they find themselves in or the 
relationships they enter into.    This is so in a variety of areas of law, but 
perhaps most obviously in determining the validity of recognised and state-
sanctioned conjugal relationships (that is to say marriage and civil 
partnership).  Given the wide importance of gender, it is somewhat surprising 
that Parliament has never seen the need to lay down any criteria for the 
GHWHUPLQLQJRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VJHQGHUThis is not to be explained on the basis 
that, until at any rate the development of gender reassignment surgery, 
gender is always certain, for the problem of the hermaphrodite has been 
exercising legal commentators for almost two millenia1.  It is, however, the 
ability of modern medical practice to respond in a practical way to the needs 
of transsexuals that has created an environment in which neither the courts 
nor the legislature can ignore either gender itself or individuals who seek to 
change from one to the other. 
  
The Pre-2004 Transgender Cases 
The story of George Jamieson, who became April Ashley and married the 
Hon Arthur Corbett, is well-known, as is 2UPURG -¶V MXGJPHQW annulling the 
                                                 
1 See D. 1, v, 10.; Grotius Jurisprudence of Holland I, iii, 6; Sanchez De Sancto Matrimonii 




marriage in the seminal case that followed2.  Ormrod J, a judge chosen to 
hear the case because of his medical as well as legal background, made two 
crucial findings: (i) that there were four factors to be taken into account in 
GHWHUPLQLQJ D SHUVRQ¶V JHQGHU: chromosomal, gonadal, genital and 
psychological and (ii) that when the first three are congruent at birth then that 
GHWHUPLQHVDSHUVRQ¶VJHQGHUIRUWKHUHVWRIWKHLUOLIHThough a first instance 
decision, it dominated the law of England (and was assumed to reflect the law 
of Scotland) for over three decades, setting the rule not only in its own context 
(validity of marriage) but also in other areas of law such as the criminal law3 
and employment discrimination law4.  Regular challenges to the Corbett rule 
were made in the European Court of Human Rights, on the basis that the 
8.¶V SRVLWLRQ ZDV LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH DUWLFOH  ULJKW WR SULYDWH OLIH DQG WKH
article 12 right to marry and found a family5 and, until 2002, these challenges 
were consistently rejected by the European Court (if with an ever-decreasing 
majority).  Also at around that time the domestic English courts faced the most 
sustained challenge to the rule in Corbett since its decision, in a case which 
raised exactly the same issue, in the same context, if in rather more benign 
circumstances. 
 
In Bellinger v. Bellinger the judge at first instance refused to grant a 
declaration of validity of a marriage between Mr and Mrs Bellinger, the latter 
having undergone gender reassignment surgery before a ceremony of 
marriage 20 years previously.  The Court of Appeal refused the appeal and 
refused also to overrule Corbett, on the ground that to do so would involve a 
major change of the law which it is properly for Parliament rather than the 
court to make6.  There was, however, a strong dissenting judgment from 
Thorpe LJ which, three months later, was founded upon by Chisholm J in the 
                                                 
2  Corbett v. Corbett [1971] P 83. 
3 R v. Tan [1983] QB 1053, which involved a conviction for a gender-specific crime.  This case 
was not followed in Australia: R v. Harris and McGuiness (1988) 17 NSWLR 158. 
4 White v. British Sugar Corporation [1977] IRLR 121 (now overruled: see n. 39 below). 
5 Rees v. United Kingdom [1986] 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 
622; Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 163; X, Y and Z v. United 
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143.  An in-depth analysis of the ECHR cases is to be found in R 
5HHG³7UDQVVH[XDOVDQG(XURSHDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV/DZ´LQ*UDXSQHUDQG7DKPLQGMLVHGV





Family Court of Australia in Kevin and Jennifer v. Attorney General7 where the 
claim was to all intents and purposes exactly the same.  Chisholm J explains 
how Corbett had been based on scientific propositions that could not stand in 
light of understandings developed since 1970 and on social perceptions that 
were, even on their own terms, no more than unreasoned assertions.  Nine 
months after Kevin and Jennifer the European Court in Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom8 also rejected Corbett (and their own previous jurisprudence on the 
issue), on the basis that it was indeed inconsistent with both articles 8 and 12 
of the ECHR, and seven months after Goodwin &KLVKROP -¶V MXGJPHQW in 
Kevin was upheld by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia9 (if on 
different grounds).  Less than two months after that, the House of Lords 
handed down their decision in Bellinger10.  To the surprise of many, the House 
RI /RUGV GLG QRW IROORZ 7KRUSH /-¶V GLVVHQW DQG UHLQWHUSUHW (QJOLVK ODZ LQ D
way that was consistent with the ECHR.  Rather, they held that Corbett 
represented the true state of English law and that legislative rather than 
judicial change was the only possible route to ECHR consistency.  Three 
PRQWKVODWHUDQGRQWKHILUVWDQQLYHUVDU\RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
Goodwin the British Government published a draft Bill designed to reverse the 
rule in Corbett and Bellinger.  The Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into 
force in April 2005. 
 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Nature of Transsexualism 
This Act allows individuals to apply to a Gender Recognition Panel, for the 
JUDQWLQJRID³*HQGHU5HFRJQLWLRQ&HUWLILFDWH´11, on the granting of which the 
DSSOLFDQW¶V JHQGHU EHFRPHV ³WKH DFTXLUHG JHQGHU´12, subject to certain 
exceptions to be discussed later. The Panel is obliged to grant the Certificate 
if the applicant has or has had gender dysphoria, has lived in the acquired 
gender for at least two years, and intends to continue to do so for the rest of 
his or her life.13  $V VXFK WKH 3DQHO¶V GHFLVLRQ LV RQH RI IDFW UDWKHU WKDQ
                                                 
7 [2001] Fam CA 1074. 
8 (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
9 [2003] Fam CA 94. 
10 [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 All ER 593. 
11 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s 1. 
12 Ibid, s 9. 




judgment.  There is no requirement for surgical or any other form of medical 
treatment before an application may be made or a Certificate granted.  A 
married person or a person in a civil partnership is not entitled to a Gender 
Recognition Certificate but may apply for an interim Gender Recognition 
Certificate14 which allows for the speedy dissolution of their marriage or civil 
partnership15: on such dissolution the divorce court will issue a full Gender 
Recognition Certificate16 which itself will entitle the parties to re-establish their 
legal relationship with their ex-spouse or ex-civil partner as, respectively, a 
civil partnership or a marriage. 
 
Though it is clear that the Act is designed to reverse the rule in Corbett and 
Bellinger, the requirement to satisfy the European Convention on Human 
Rights has meant that it goes very much further than simply allowing 
transgendered persons to marry in their new gender.  It is, however, not 
immediately apparent either how far the Act goes or, as we will see, the extent 
to which it remains necessary to rely on its terms.  These matters depend, at 
least partly, upon the mischief that the Act is designed to address, and the key 
to understanding what that mischief is lies in long-established judicial attitudes 
to the very nature of transsexualism, which remain of crucial importance.  In 
Corbett WKH PHGLFDO HYLGHQFH YDULRXVO\ GHVFULEHG $SULO $VKOH\ DV ³D PDOH
homosexual transVH[XDOLVW´³DFDVWUDWHGPDOH´DQG³DQLQWHUVH[´17  Ormrod J 
described transsexuals as persons ZLWK ³DQ H[WUHPHO\ SRZHUIXO XUJH WR
become a member of tKHRSSRVLWHVH[´ZKRVXIIHUSV\FKRORJLFDOO\³EXWGRQRW
UHVSRQG IDYRXUDEO\ WR SV\FKRORJLFDO WUHDWPHQW´18  This is reflected in the 
description offered by Lord Nicholls in Bellinger: 
³7UDQVVH[XDOSHRSOHDUHERUQZLWKWKHDQDWRP\RIDSHUVRQRIRQHVH[
but with an unshakeable belief or feeling that they are persons of the 
opposite sex.  They experience themselves as being of the opposite 
                                                 
14 Ibid, s 4(3) as amended by s 250 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
15 Gender Recognition Act 2004, sched 2, amending s 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
for England and Wales, s 1 of the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 for Scotland, and art 14 of the 
Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order for Northern Ireland. 
16 Gender Recognition Act 2004, s. 5. 
17 [1971] P at 99. 




VH[ « 7KH DHWLRORJ\ RI WKLV FRQGLWLRQ UHPDLQV XQFHUWDLQ  ,W LV QRZ
JHQHUDOO\UHFRJQLVHGDVDSV\FKLDWULFGLVRUGHU´19. 
These passages show that both Ormrod J and Lord Nicholls see gender 
dysphoria as a disorder of the mind: they regard it as axiomatic that for 
persons with whom there is a gender disparity between the body and the mind 
it is self-evidently the mind and not the body that is suffering the disorder and 
that surgery or medical intervention is appropriate only because psychological 
intervention is ineffective.  Yet wKRHYHU LV ³JHQHUDOO\ UHFRJQLVLQJ´ WKLV
assertion, it is not transsexual people who are much more likely to regard the 
abnormality as being one of the body20  -  it is their body that is wrong rather 
than their mind, with the result that surgery or medical intervention is 
appropriate in its own terms, which is to ensure that their body is altered to 
reflect the reality of their mind.  The supposition that transsexualism is a 
disorder of the mind allows the judges to make a more crucial assertion: that 
surgery to alter the body may well harmonise the body with the mind but it 
neither cures transsexualism nor gLYHV WKHSDWLHQW WKH ³ULJKW´RU ³WUXH´ERG\
5HIOHFWLQJ 2UPURG -¶V ODQJXDJH RI WKH ³DUWLILFLDO YDJLQD´ that April Ashley 
possessed21, Lord Nicholls describes gender reassignment as follows: ³)RU
men [surgery] may mean castration or inversion of the penis to create a false 
vagina.  For women it may mean a mastectomy, hysterectomy or creation of a 
IDOVHSHQLVE\SKDOORSODVW\´22.  The surgery, in other words, is designed not to 
UHIOHFWUHDOLW\RUIDFWEXWWRIDOVLI\WKHSDWLHQW¶VERG\DVDZD\RIDPHOLRUDWLQJ
(but not curing) the disorder of the mind.  It is but second best to a cure, which 
would be altering the mind rather than the body.  ³7KH SXUSRVH RI WKHVH
operations [castration, amputation of the penis and construction of an artificial 
YDJLQD@´ GHFODUHG 2rmrod J in Corbett ³LV RI FRXUVH WR KHOS WR UHOLHYH WKH
SDWLHQW¶VV\PSWRPVDQGWRDVVLVWLQWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHLUGLVRUGHULWLVQRW
WR FKDQJH WKHLU VH[´23  In Bellinger Lord Nicholls uses virtually the same 
language: ³the aim of the surgery is to make the individual feel more 
                                                 
19 [2003] UKHL 21 at para 7. 
20 Recognised by Baronness Hale in A v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2004] 
UKHL 21 at para 26. 
21 [1971] P at 98. 
22 [2003] UKHL 21, per Lord Nicholls at para 40. 




comfortable with his or her body, QRW WR µWXUQ D PDQ LQWR D ZRPDQ¶ RU YLFH
versa´24.   Lord Hope is to the same effect: 
³7KH HVVHQFH RI WKH SUREOHP DV , VHH LW OLHV LQ WKH LPSRVVLELOLW\ RI
changing completely the sex which individuals acquire when they are 
ERUQ « 0HGLFDO VFLHQFH LV XQDEOH LQ LWV SUHVHQW VWDWH WR FRPSOHWH
the process.  It cannot turn a man into a woman or turn a woman into a 
man.  That is not what the treatment seeks to do after all, although it is 
described aVJHQGHUUHDVVLJQPHQWVXUJHU\´25. 
 
If medical science is unable to do this, then the law cannot do so either, and 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is, therefore, of limited scope  -  it does not 
WXUQ D PDQ LQWR D ZRPDQ QRU GRHV LW WDFNOH WKH ³LPSRVVLELOLW\´ of changing 
sex.  Rather, it merely permits individuals to be treated for the purposes of the 
law as if they belonged to the gender that they live their lives in rather than the 
gender that they (in reality) remain.  Put shortly, the Act creates a legal fiction 
which allows the law to LJQRUHIRUPRVWSXUSRVHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VUHDOJHQGHU 
 
Gender Reassignment and Marriage 
The explanation for this insistence on immutability RI ³UHDO´ JHQGHU lies, I 
suggest, in the perceived need for absolute certainty within the context in 
which Corbett and Bellinger arose, that is to say marriage26.  Ormrod J denied 
that April Ashley was a woman because, with a merely artificial vagina, she 
could not naturally SHUIRUP³WKHHVVHQWLDOUROHRIDZRPDQLQPDUULDJH´27 and 
that ³KDving regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the 
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria [for determining gender in 
that context] PXVW«EHELRORJLFDO´28  Lord Hope and Lord Nicholls similarly 
hold that WKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGV³PDOH´DQG³IHPDOH´ZLWKLQWKHFRQtext of 
marriage must refer back to the role that men and women usually play in 
                                                 
24 [2003] UKHL 21 at para 41, emphasis added. 
25 Ibid at para 57. 
26 In the words of Baronness Hale in A v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2004] 
8.+/DWSDUD³0DUULDJHLVVWLOODVWDWXVJRRGDJDLQVWWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKFODULW\DQG
FRQVLVWHQF\DUHYLWDO´ 





procreation: they assume (as the European Court does not29) that procreation 
and marriage are inherently and necessarily connected with the result that 
³PDOH´ DQG ³IHPDOH´ in marriage law are words referring not so much to 
gender roles as procreative potential.   
 
³2IFRXUVH´VD\V/RUG+RSH30 ³LW LVQRWJLYHQ WRHYHU\PDQRUHYHU\
woman to have, or to want to have, children.  But the ability to 
reprRGXFHRQH¶VRZQNLQGOLHVDWWKHKHDUWRIDOOFUHDWLRQDQGWKHVLQJOH
characteristic which invariably distinguishes the adult male from the 
adult female throughout the animal kingdom is the part which each sex 
plays in the act of reproduction.  When Parliament uses the words 
µPDOH¶ DQG µIHPDOH¶ LQ VHFWLRQ F RI WKH [Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973] it must be taken to have used those words in the sense which 
WKH\QRUPDOO\ZRXOGKDYHZKHQ WKH\DUHXVHG WRGHVFULEHDSHUVRQ¶V
sex, even though they are plainly capable of including men and women 
ZKRKDSSHQWREHLQIHUWLOHRUDUHSDVWWKHDJHRIFKLOGEHDULQJ´ 
 
There is no question but that there is a clear difference in the factual role that 
each gender plays in the natural process of reproduction, but it is a leap of 
logic to assume from this that these roles require to be replicated in the legal 
institution of marriage.  For it should not be forgotten that marriage is a legal 
construct rather than a natural state of being.  Animals who mate for life, like 
swans, mate, they do not marry; bull walruses with harems of cows are not 
polygamists.  Yet Lord Nicholls is quite deliberate in drawing what he 
perceives as an essential link between procreation and marriage.  He defines 
gender, for the purposes of marriage, as involving a general capacity to 
reproduce, since the primary UDLVRQG¶HWUH of marriage was for many centuries 
reproduction31.  The fact that modern society no longer sees marriage this 
way was one of the major reasons why the Family Court of Australia felt able 
to depart from the Corbett precedent32, but Lord Nicholls is altogether 
XQZLOOLQJ WR JR VR IDU  +H VWDWHV PHUHO\ WKDW ³IRU D ORQJ WLPH QRZ WKH
                                                 
29 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at para 98. 
30 [2003] UKHL 21 at para 64. 
31 Ibid at para 46. 




emphasis has been different.  Variously expressed, there is much more 
HPSKDVLVQRZRQWKHµPXWXDOVRFLHWy, help and comfort that the one ought to 
KDYHRI WKHRWKHU¶´33.  However, even when marriage was the primary social 
environment in which procreation took place, it never followed that individual 
marriages required to be procreative in intent or potential: the infertile can 
marry validly, as can those who deliberately take steps to avoid reproduction.  
The House of Lords itself over 50 years ago accepted that consummation 
could validate a marriage even when steps were positively taken to avoid 
procreation34.  Since individual marriages do not require to be procreative, it is 
illogical to define gender for the purposes of marriage in terms of procreative 
potential.  In reality, Bellinger represents a judicial fear, not of those who are 
lacking ³DOO the equipmenW´ LQ /RUG +RSH¶V XQIRUWXQDWH SKUDVH35), but that 
marriage will lose its opposite-sex character.  If gender reassignment surgery 
does not in reality turn a man into a woman but WKDW ³PDQ´ LV SHUPLWWHG WR
marry a man, then the very nature of marriage is altered  -  it is opened up to 
same-sex couples (so long as one of the men has had his penis chopped off 
first).  Lord Hope let the mask slip with a remarkable misinterpretation of the 
result in Goodwin v. UK  +H VD\V WKLV ³[The] problem would be solved if it 
were possible for a transsexual to marry a person of the same sex, which is 
indeed what the European Court of Human Rights has now held should be the 
position in Goodwin´36  The European Court held no such thing.  Recognising 
a change of gender actually allows marriage to remain opposite-sex, but only 
if gender is recognised as being as much a legal construct as marriage itself.  
/RUG+RSH¶V slip is explained by his underlying belief that, whatever the law 
VD\V D SHUVRQ¶V ³WUXH´ JHQGHU UHPDLQV GHILQHG E\ the body he or she was 
born with.  Dressed up as a requirement for procreative potential, the true 
message of Bellinger is that while the law may evolve in such a way that a 
SHUVRQ¶V OHJDOJHQGHU FDQFKDQJH DSHUVRQ¶V WUXHJHQGHU DQG WKHUHE\ the 
opposite-sex nature of the legal institution of marriage) remains immutable. 
  
                                                 
33 [2003] UKHL 21 at para 46. 
34 Baxter v. Baxter 1948 AC 274, in which it was held that the wearing of a condom does not 
prevent consummation.  The very asking of the question illustrates graphically just how 
artificial and technical the concept of marriage is. 
35 [2003] UKHL 21 at para 57. 




Gender Reassignment in Other Contexts 
It needs always to be remembered that Ormrod J in Corbett was careful to 
limit his conclusions to their own context, and though there is no need in logic 
to follow these conclusions in areas other than marriage, subsequent cases 
assumed that there was37.  Nothing in the House of Lords decision in Bellinger 
suggests an application of that case wider than marriage and the heavy 
reliance on the nature of marriage and on the interpretation of the particular 
marriage statute in question suggests strongly that, at the very least, different 
arguments would need to be deployed in different contexts if the same 
conclusion is to be reached.  In fact, shortly after Bellinger, the same court 
held that a different conclusion was possible, indeed required, in different 
circumstances, with the result that a person was for the first time in the United 
Kingdom legally recognised as belonging to their new gender, this even 
before the coming into effect of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
 
A v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police38 involved a male to female 
transsexual who had had her application to become a police officer rejected 
on the basis of her transsexuality.  To discriminate in employment against a 
person because of their transgender status has for some time now been 
recognised as being contrary to the Sex Discrimination Act 197539, but the 
Chief Constable sought to rely on the defence that being of one gender or the 
RWKHU ZDV D ³JHQXLQH RFFXSDWLRQDO TXDOLILFDWLRQ´ for the police force, as a 
result of statutory rules requiring that when the police undertake intimate body 
searches only male police officers may search males and only female police 
officers may search females. 
 
The House of Lords were unanimous in rejecting this defence, on the ground 
that it would have been within the operational control of the Chief Constable to 
exempt Ms A from carrying out such searches at all: this would have been a 
more proportionate response to the situation than the outright refusal to 
                                                 
37 See notes 6 & 7 above. 
38 [2004] UKHL 21. 
39 P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] 1 ECR 2143, [1996] 2 CMLR 247; KB v. 




employ her.  More crucially they held40 WKDWWKHZRUGV³ZRPDQ´DQG³PDQ´LQ
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 do not refer, in that context, to procreative 
ability (even if imaginary) but rather muVWEHUHDG³DVUHIHUULQJWRWKHDFTXLUHG
gender of a post-operative transsexual who is visually and for all practical 
purposes indistinguishable from non-tranVVH[XDOPHPEHUVRI WKDWJHQGHU´41.  
In reaching that result the Court relied heavily on the European Court of 
-XVWLFH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH(TXDO7UHDWPHQW'LUHFWLYH42 and in particular its 
decision in P v. S & Cornwall County Council,43 described by Lord Nicholls44 
DV ³WKH VKHHW-DQFKRU RI 0V $¶V FDVH´  A narrow application of A v. West 
Yorkshire Police would limit it to equal treatment cases, but the decision is 
actually much wider.  Their Lordships rejected the crucial finding in Corbett 
and endorsed in Bellinger that legal gender is determined at birth and cannot 
thereafter be altered: it was this finding that had allowed the Corbett rule to be 
extended beyond the narrow confines of marriage.  A wider ratio of A v. West 
Yorkshire Police is that gender can only be determined by an identification of 
the best way to further the policy of the particular statute in question.  In A v. 
West Yorkshire Police that policy was ³WRDIIRUGSURWHFWLRQWRWKHGLJQLW\DQG
privacy of those being searched in a situation where they may well be 
SHFXOLDUO\YXOQHUDEOH´,45 and this was achieved by accepting that the applicant 
belonged to her new gender, even without the enactment of the Gender 
Recognition Act.  This PHDQVWKDWWKHGHILQLWLRQRI³PDOH´DQG³IHPDOH´PLJKW
be different depending upon the issue  -  the same person may be male for 
one purpose (say, following Bellinger, marriage) and female for another 
(following A v. West Yorkshire Police, performing intimate body searches).  
 
This is not a limited or academic point.  Even after the coming into force of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004, there will be individuals who have not sought, 
or are in the process of seeking, or who are not eligible to obtain, a Gender 
Recognition Certificate but who are living their lives in the other gender to that 
in which they were brought up.  A person may not have lived in the new 
                                                 
40 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry dissenting. 
41 [2004] UKHL 21, per Lord Bingham at para 11. 
42 76/207/EEC. 
43 [1996] 1 ECR 2143, [1996] 2 CMLR 247. 
44 [2004] UKHL 21 at para 10. 




gender for two years; an individual may have sound reasons for not wishing to 
bring a successful marriage to an end; the individual may be too young to 
access the Act; or the question may arise after the death of the transsexual 
person.  With every gender-specific legal rule the court faced with a 
transsexual person who does not (or does not yet or never did) possess a 
Gender Recognition Certificate will have to ask whether the real purpose of 
the statute is achieved by recognising or by refusing recognition of the new 
gender.  Corbett and Bellinger relied heavily on procreative potential to deny 
recognition; A v. West Yorkshire Police relied heavily on the Equal Treatment 
Directive to allow recognition. But there is no middle way between recognition 
and non-recognition in any one situation and the question becomes which 
approach is likely to be adopted in contexts other than equal treatment and 
marriage.  I suggest that the underlying rationale in Corbett and Bellinger is 
inherently narrow (procreative potential) while the underlying rationale in A v. 
West Yorkshire Police (furthering the policy of the statute) is inherently wide, 
with the result that it will now be difficult to deny recognition of the new gender 
for the purpose of any rule to which procreation can be shown to be entirely 
irrelevant.  The Gender Recognition Act becomes, therefore, of much more 
limited scope than at first sight appears.  We may test this by applying 
Bellinger and A v. West Yorkshire Police to a number of different gender-
specific statutory provisions: whenever the former applies the Act must be 
used to effect a gender change, but when the latter applies the Act may be 
avoided. 
 
One such statutory provision is the rule in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
WKDW D FKLOGUHQ¶V KHDULQJ WKH WUibunal in Scotland charged with making 
decisions in respect of child offenders and neglected children) shall be 
composed of a panel of three members, at least one of whom is a man and at 
least one of whom is a woman46.  Procreative potential is self-evidently not 
relevant to the ability of a panel member to make appropriate decisions as to 
the welfare of a child.  If a person who has changed sex is to all intents and 
purposes indistinguishable in his or her acquired gender from a person born 
                                                 




into that gender, then the new gender ought to be accepted even without, or 
before the granting of, a Gender Recognition Certificate, for in that way the 
social policy behind the legislative rule (ensuring that each child who appears 
before a hearing can relate in gender terms to at least one of the decision-
makers) is thereby achieved. 
 
Another gender-specific rule is contained in the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990, whereby the male partner of a woman who gives birth 
after infertility treatment shall be deemed to be the father of the child47.  In X, 
Y and Z v. United Kingdom48 the European Court held that the refusal to 
DFFHSW WKDW D IHPDOH WR PDOH WUDQVVH[XDO FRXOG EH UHJDUGHG DVD ³PDn´ IRU
this purpose was not contrary to the article 8 right to family life.  The point of 
the rule in the 1990 Act is to confer paternity on a man who is not and cannot 
be the natural father.  The rule, in other words, is engaged by lack of 
procreative potential, so that very lack cannot be used to deny WKH UXOH¶V
application in particular circumstances:  Bellinger is therefore of no relevance.  
The aim of the 1990 rule appears to be to ensure that children born through 
infertility treatment have fathers in both the legal and the social sense.  It 
might well be argued that since the applicant in X, Y and Z adopts the social 
role of father (confirmed by the granting to him of parental responsibility) and 
since recognition of his legal fatherhood would allow the statutory purpose to 
be achieved, the effect of applying the wide interpretation of A v. West 
Yorkshire Police suggested above will be to put in doubt the continued 
authority of X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom. 
 
Again, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 creates an institution for same-sex 
couples equivalent in most respects to marriage.  It is, however, limited in 
availability to couples who are of the same sex and is therefore, at least 
relationally, every bit as gender-specific as marriage.  The question is this:  
Can a male to female transsexual enter into a civil partnership with a female 
in the absence of a Gender Recognition Certificate?  In other words, is 
gender, for the purposes of civil partnership, determined by the marriage rule 
                                                 
47 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 28(3). 




in Bellinger or by the social rule in A v. West Yorkshire Police?  The initial 
temptation would be to say that since civil partnership is designed to replicate 
marriage the same rule should apply.  However, it is a mistake to see civil 
partnership as replicating marriage.  The legislature was very careful to 
maintain a number of differences, most of them relating to conjugal sexual 
activity and parenthood49.  These were the very issues that determined the 
approach in Bellinger but they are quite deliberately not relevant for civil 
partnership.  And if procreative potential is at the heart of Bellinger, its 
irrelevance to civil partnership could not be clearer.50  So we must try to 
identify a purpose behind the gender-specificity in the rules for civil 
partnership other than any relating to sexual activity.  If the purpose of the 
same-sex requirement in the Civil Partnership Act is to clearly differentiate 
that institution from marriage and to reinforce the opposite-sex nature of the 
institution of marriage, then this is, in fact, achieved more readily by 
recognising than by denying the validity of a civil partnership entered into by 
two persons who lead their lives and present to the world as a couple of the 
same gender, notwithstanding that one of them used to be of the opposite 
gender.  The fear in Bellinger, as we have seen, was fundamentally the fear of 
same-sex marriage.  This fear would be realised, at least outwardly, by 
insisting that a transsexual person retains their original gender, thereby 
requiring that person to enter into a marriage with a person who is the same 
gender as that in which the transsexual person now presents to the world, 
rather than a civil partnership.  An argument against this might be that the 
Gender Recognition Act provides a ready means by which a transsexual can 
seek recognition of his or her new gender and that to rely upon the wide 
interpretation of A v. West Yorkshire Police is to avoid this statutory 
mechanism.  But there is nothing in the Gender Recognition Act, or in A v. 
West Yorkshire Police, that requires the use of the statutory procedure.  The 
Act nowhere provides, as it could easily have done, that recognition of a new 
gender can be achieved only by the statutory process.  And that process 
might not be available: for example a civil partnership may be entered into in 
                                                 
49 In relation to the Scottish differences between marriage and civil partnership, see Norrie 
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from the age of 16, but a Gender Recognition Certificate cannot be applied for 
until the person is 1851. 
 
A rather more difficult question concerns those areas explicitly excluded from 
the operation of the Gender Recognition Act.  On the granting of a Gender 
Recognition Certificate the acquired gender is recognised for all purposes 
other than the stated exceptions, but the Act does not explicitly state that the 
new sex is not recognised  -  merely that the Gender Recognition Certificate 
does not have effect in the stated circumstances.  So the question arises 
whether A v. West Yorkshire Police could be used to provide recognition in 
such circumstances.  One exception is parental status52 but that, being a 
matter of procreation, is likely to be governed if not by the Act then by 
Bellinger.  Another exception to the effect of the Gender Recognition 
Certificate is succession to titles of honour.53  Again, because of the centuries 
old assumptions upon which legitimacy for this purpose is based 
(primogeniture and blood-link) any argument based on A v. West Yorkshire 
Police is likely to fail.  Entitlement to take part in gender-limited sporting 
events may be prohibited or restricted notwithstanding the possession of a 
Gender Recognition Certificate,54 EXWRQO\ LI WKLV LV ³QHFHVVDU\ WR VHFXUH D
fair competition or (bWKHVDIHW\RIFRPSHWLWRUV´  ,IVXFKUHVWULFWLRQ LVQRWVR
necessary then the Gender Recognition Certificate must be given effect to; 
and if a Certificate is not possessed then applying the wide rationale in A v. 
West Yorkshire Police suggests that recognition of the new gender must be 
allowed in those sports in which no competitive advantage is obtained by 
having the physical attributes of the other gender (bowls, croquet and the 
like). 
  
Perhaps most difficult of all are the gender-specific offences.  A Gender 
Recognition Certificate does not have effect in this context55.  So a male to 
female transsexual who holds a Gender Recognition Certificate can be 
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52 2004 Act, s 12. 
53 2004 Act, s 16. 
54 2004 Act, s 19.  See Richards v. United States Tennis Association 400 NYS 2d 267 (1977). 




convicted of being a male living off the earnings of a prostitute; a female to 
male transsexual can be raped but a male to female transsexual cannot be56.  
An argument based on the social utility of these (socially useless57) rules may 
well be precluded by the very fact that Parliament has chosen to retain them 
and to provide that they are unaffected by the statutory Gender Recognition 
Certificate: if so the court may well feel obliged to hold that they are 
unaffected by a non-statutory change of gender via A v. West Yorkshire 
Police.  It is submitted, however, that this is to read more effect into the 2004 
Act than its terms provide, for as we have seen the Act does not explicitly 
exclude gender recognition by means other than the statutory process. The 
ideal solution to this problem is, of course, to render the criminal law entirely 
gender-neutral, but until that is done transsexuals may be unable to obtain the 
benefits (or to avoid the disadvantages) of the gender in which they actually 
live their lives. 
 
Conclusion 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was fought for over the course of three 
decades.  Its passing was rightly seen as a great victory for the transgender 
community, and for the human rights of equality and dignity.  Especially after 
Bellinger it was seen as a dramatic metamorphoVLV LQ WKH 8.¶V DWWLWXGHV WR
gender and gender-roles.  But if the full implications of A v. West Yorkshire 
Police are as described above and its wide rationale adopted in areas beyond 
equal treatment then the effect of the 2004 Act is limited to marriage and, 
perhaps, re-registration of birth certificates.  Having shown willful 
wrongheadedness in Bellinger58, the House of Lords redeemed themselves 
very shortly thereafter in A v. West Yorkshire Police.  The earlier case made 
the Act inevitable, while the latter case rendered it for many purposes 
unnecessary. 
                                                 
56 Unless statute makes that offence non-gender-specific, as it has done in England but not in 
Scotland. 
57 Interestingly, Baronness Hale in A v. West Yorkshire Police at para 52 suggested that it 
was to avoid this very nonsense that the Court of Appeal in R v. Tan >@4%³IRXQGLW
FRQYHQLHQW´WRIROORZCorbett to ensure that the male to female transsexual in that case could 
be convicted of the gender-specific offence of living off the earnings of a prostitute.  
58 $PRUHGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKDWFDVHPD\EHIRXQGLQ1RUULH³Bellinger v. Bellinger, the 
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